Sowing the Wind: Rebellion and Violence in Theory and Practice by Friedlander, Robert A.
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 6 
Number 1 Spring Article 7 
May 2020 
Sowing the Wind: Rebellion and Violence in Theory and Practice 
Robert A. Friedlander 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Robert A. Friedlander, Sowing the Wind: Rebellion and Violence in Theory and Practice, 6 Denv. J. Int'l L. & 
Pol'y 83 (1976). 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at 
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 
FACULTY COMMENT
Sowing the Wind: Rebellion and Violence in
Theory and Practice*
ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER**
For they have sown the wind, and
they shall reap the whirlwind ....
Hosea 8:7
"I have had it with terrorism."' This recent statement by
President Gerald R. Ford, quintessentially reflects the constant
concern, the omnipresent fear, and the intense frustration of
both governments and private citizens over the continuing
threat of global terror-violence. Not only democracy, but the
very concept of the state itself as the administrative custodian
of political power is presently under attack in all areas of the
world.2 Public protest by bomb and by bullet rather than by
ballot and by peaceful demonstration has become an all-too
familiar symbol of the last decade. A very real spectre haunting
the corridors of power in this age of nuclear stalemate is the
feeling that "terrorism will become more than a sporadic dis-
ruption to law and order; it will menace the very survival of
civilization itself."
'3
Terrorism, either national or international, is primarily "a
weapon of the weak." 4 It is the strategy by which dissident
political groups, unable to achieve power or to influence gov-
* CROZIER, B., A THEORY OF CONFLICT, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY
10017 (1974), xvii, 245 p.; BASSIOUNI, M.C. (Editor), INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
POLITICAl. CRIMES, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, IL 62703 (1975), xxvi, 594 p.;
ALEXANDER. Y. (Editor), INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES. Praeger Special Studies, Praeger Publishers Inc., New York, NY 10003
(1976), xx, 390 p.
** Associate Professor of International Law, Lewis University College of Law;
Member, International Committee on Terrorism, World Association of Lawyers.
1. Speech before the South Florida Chapter, Federal Bar Association, reported in
Chicago Tribune, Feb. 15, 1976, at 3, col. 4.
2. B. CROZIER, A THEORY OF CONFLICT 3-12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CROZIER].
3. Alexander, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM xvii (Y. Alexander ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDERI. This feeling was shared by many of the
participants at the Department of State Conference on International Terrorism, Wash-
ington, D.C., Feb. 25-26, 1976.
4. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 129.
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ernmental policy through legitimate means, can coerce govern-
ments, overturn established regimes, and intimidate entire
peoples. Although a precise legal definition has yet to be formu-
lated, international terrorism may be said to be that
"[i]ndividual or collective coercive conduct employing strate-
gies of terror-violence which contain an international element
or are directed against an internationally protected target and
whose aim is to produce a power-oriented outcome." 15 It is
above all else a technique "for demolishing a State."'
The underlying issue-and one that may never be re-
solved-is how to divorce terrorism, which is essentially crimi-
nality,' from rebellion or revolution, which are generally recog-
nized remedies in international law.' When is rebellion legally
and morally permissible? Under what conditions can revolu-
tion be legitimized? Can revolutionary violence ever be justi-
fied? Or, to view the other side of the coin, "[w]hen is it wrong
to rebel?"' How does one reconcile America's revolutionary ori-
gins and Thomas Jefferson's injunction that "[tjhe tree of
liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of
patriots and tyrants" with the United States Draft Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of Interna-
tional Terrorism?
0
The answer, if there is an answer, is that although rebel-
lion cannot be separated from conflict, violence must not be
directed at innocent parties. To "endanger, threaten or take
5. Bassiouni et al., Final Document, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
CRIMES xiv (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI]. Cf. Paust, A
Survey of Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punish-
ment. and Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 431, 432-35 (1975)
Ihereinafter cited as Paust].
6. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 119.
7. Friedlander, Terrorism, 2 BARRISTER 11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Friedlan-
der]; Murphy, The Role of International Law in the Prevention of Terrorist Kidnap-
ping of Diplomatic Personnel, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 305-09; S. SCHAFER, THE
POLITICAL CRIMINAL: THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY AND CRIME (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SCHAFER1.
8. Cf. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-108 (2d ed. 1973);
.IL. BRIERI, (H. Waldock ed.), THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNA-
rIONAIL LAW OF PEACE 137-61 (6th ed. 1963): THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR (R.
Falk ed. 1971).
9. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 11.
10. Cf. Kutner, A Philosophical Perspective on Rebellion, and Murphy, United
Nations Proposals on the Control and Repression of Terrorism, in BASSIOUNI, supra
note 5, at 51-61, 493-506; and CROZIER, supra note 2, at 13-31.
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innocent human lives and to jeopardize fundamental free-
doms" of the individual is to disregard public international
law, declarations and resolutions of the United Nations relat-
ing to human rights, and the basic provisions of the United
Nations Charter." If innocent civilian populations are to be
subjected to random or selective terrorist attack, then terror-
violence becomes destructive not only of law and legal systems
but potentially of modern civilization itself.
Nonetheless, terrorism has become inextricably inter-
twined with so-called national liberation movements. On the
one hand, to quote the U.N. Secretariat's study of the origins
and causes of international terrorism, "the legitimacy of a
cause does not in itself legitimize the use of certain forms of
violence, especially against the innocent." However, force and,
by implication, violence become legitimate if they are utilized
by national liberation movements asserting the principles of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples." In fact, the
United Nations has consistently and repeatedly supported a
lawful force exception when it involves "the right to self-
determination" and the struggle of "peoples under colonial and
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination."1' 3 The most
pressing problem, which has yet to be resolved, is how to bal-
ance the equities between the U.N.-asserted right to self-
determination on the one hand, and the maintenance of a mini-
mum standard of world public order on the other.
If terrorism "is normally a central feature of revolutionary
war" and a constant element in an ambience of domestic tur-
11. United Nations Secretariat, Measures to Prevent International Terrorism
Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Free-
doms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of
Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause
Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect
Radical Changes, U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/418, Nov. 2, 1973, reprinted in part in BASSIOUNI,
supra note 5, at 5-10.
12. Id., at 6-9.
13. Cf. Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against
Criminal and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103 (1973), reprinted
in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 213-15; Report of the Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619, Dec. 14, 1974. For
a general analysis of this important declaration, see Comment, The United Nations
Definition of Aggression: A Preliminary Analysis, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 171
(1975).
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moil," then what of legality, whether international or domes-
tic? Must one stand aside until the revolutionary process, to
paraphrase Vergniaud, devours everyone? If the cause is anti-
colonial under present international law, are there no legal
norms that can be applied against the slaughter of the inno-
cent? The answer, of course, is that remedies are possible, if
they are equitably applied. Minimum standards of conduct
could be developed which would then determine legal guide-
lines for every member of the world community." Oppressive
regimes need not be assisted, insurrections and rebellions are
distinguishable from civil wars, and external participation in
internal strife can be governed by established principles of in-
ternational law. "The essential task is to determine the divid-
ing line between civil strife which is basically criminal and that
which is an expression of the will of the people."'"
Is an armed revolt prima facie a war of national liberation?
Is a war of national liberation necessarily a civil war? And what
of subversion within the broader rubric of internal war?1 7 Dur-
ing the past fifteen years a common bond linking all domestic
categories of conflict has been that of terror-violence, with the
notable exception of the Biafran secession and Nigerian civil
war. In Biafra, as a matter of strategy and tactics, terrorism
was consciously avoided. Years later, however, a former high
official in the Biafran revolutionary government confided to
this writer that "Biafra made a mistake in not trying terrorism.
We were wrong. If we had terrorized, we would be independent
today. The PLO has shown how effective the use of terror can
be in the international arena."'"
Small wonder, then, that the chief observer of the PLO at
14. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 127-28.
15. See the proposals of Milte, Terrorism and International Order, 8 ANZAS J.
CRIMINOLO( Y 101, 111 (1975), and Paust, supra note 5.
16. Novogrod, Internal Strife, Self-Determination, and World Order, in
BASSIOUNI. supra note 5, at 113. Paust, supra note 5, at 459-62, is especially critical of
those who would link together self-determination and terror-violence. For a more de-
tailed analysis of self-determination, see Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-
Political Inquir,, 1975 DET. COL. L. REV. 71.
17. Cf. Dinstein, Terrorism and War of Liberation: An Israeli Perspective of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 155-59 [hereinafter cited as Din-
steinj; CROZIER, supra note 2, at 199-211.
18. Statement to the author by C.C. Mojekwu, former Minister of State, Govern-




the United Nations claims that "[v]iolence is an essential part
of a liberation movement." 9 The quarrel over who is terrorizing
whom in the Middle East has been inexorable, and is by now
self-defeating. Whether it is a question of two conflicting
claims of right or one of remedying legal (and also moral)
wrongs, the Palestinian-Israeli controversy has become part of
''super-power" politics and ultimately will be resolved by
"super-power" pressures. Arguments can be put forth on both
sides, but two inescapable facts remain. Israel as a national
entity does exist, regardless of the desires of the Arab leaders,
and the April 1976 municipal elections on the West Bank repre-
sent a growing Palestinian national consciousness, however
much the Israeli government may wish otherwise.
Since 1969, with Israel as the catalyst, a Palestinian na-
tional movement has undeniably developed, and the United
Nations General Assembly has gone on record, in more than a
dozen instances, in support of the right of the Palestinian peo-
ple to self-determination. 0 Given the current dynamics of the
international community, terror-violence in the Middle East
has been "the vehicle of organized insurgency," and is, "at its
core, a movement toward national sovereignty." 2' The unre-
solved issue is whether terrorism-largely in the form of kid-
napping and murder-even if for political ends, should be
legitimized as an instrument of nation-building. Is not terror-
ist activity a political maneuver designed to disrupt personal
freedoms and to impair fundamental human rights? If so, then
has not the world community opened a political Pandora's Box,
the effect of which may not be readily understood, especially
by those who prefer short-run advantage over long-term possi-
bilities? In the words of Raymond Aron, "if men do not know
what they can expect from each other, they [can] no longer
live in [civilized] society.
'2
19. Kirk, PLO's Mild-Mannered Aggressor, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 4, 1976, § 2,
at 2, col. 4 (interview with Zehdi Labib Terzi).
20. Cf. Dinstein, supra note 17; Mallison & Mallison, An International Law Ap-
praisal of the Juridical Characteristics of the People of Palestine: The Struggle for
Human Rights, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 160-90; Alexander, From Terrorism to
War: The Anatomy of the Birth of Israel, and Weisband & Roguly, Palestinian Terror-
ism: Violence, Verbal Strategy and Legitimacy, in ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 211-
310.
21. Weisband & Roguly, id., at 259.
22. R. ARON. PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 170 (1966).
1976
88 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
Deprived of mass communications, terrorism becomes a
weapon of the impotent. Terror-violence relies almost exclu-
sively on psychological impact to convey its awful message.
2 :
1
Modern technology has greatly assisted the "public purpose
terror" of those dissident groups who consider themselves ex-
cluded from the mainstream of their country's political life. 21
Criminal violence is not purposeful in the broad sense, but
rather purposeless-aside from the lure of financial gain or the
inner satisfaction of revenge-and it is often senseless. "Terror-
ism is different from criminal violence in that its purpose is
symbolic, its means psychological, and its ends political. ' ' 2.
The medium is truly the message when terror-violence becomes
linked with mass communications.
The journalistic glorification of the strange saga of the self-
styled Symbionese Liberation Army and of Patty Hearst has
disoriented public opinion to such an extent that the victims
are subordinated to the victimizers. Never a true revolutionary
terrorist movement, the SLA has received a quantum of atten-
tion from the news media that makes them appear to have been
a major urban guerrilla movement.26
Television, especially, has played an important role in con-
fusing the public mind and promoting violence as an accepted
way of life. Does not violence breed violence, and if crime is
taken to be the natural order of things, does not this very view
engender still more criminal attacks? 7 If Western pluralistic
societies are confronted with "a saturation by images of vio-
lence," then does not some sort of regulation or control become
inevitable to ensure survival? The unarticulated premise is
that a political price must, of necessity, be paid for regulation
23. Cf. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 119-32; Hutchinson, The Concept of Revolution-
a Terrorism, 16.J. CONFLICT RES. 383 (1972); E. WALTER, TERROR AND RESISTANCE: A
TUI)Y OF POIITICAL VIOLENCE WITH CASE STUDIES OF SOME PRIMITIVE AFRICAN
COMMUNITIES Chs. 1-3 (1969); R. Moss, THE WAR FOR THE CITIES Chs. 1-2 (1972).
24. The term is taken from Mallison & Mallison, The Concept of Public Purpose
Terror in International Law: Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of
Human and Material Values, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 67 [hereinafter cited as
Mallison & Mallisoni.
25. Weisband & Roguly, Palestinian Terrorism: Violence. Verbal Strategy, and
Legitimacy, in ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 258.
26. Johnpoll, Perspectives on Political Terrorism in the United States, in
AIEXANDER. supra note 3, at 40-41. See also editorial in the Denver Post, Sept. 21, 1975,
at 23, col. 1.
27. Cf. CROZIER. supra note 2, at 27-31, 228-30; Friedlander, supra note 7, at 12.
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and control. The more effective the restraints placed upon the
communications industry, the greater the reduction of civil
liberties for the individual citizen.
Can individual or group terrorist activity be at all con-
strued to constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
crimes of aggression?" Or, in the alternative, should there be
a serious effort made by the international community to reduce
the incidence of terrorism by invoking the laws of war and
applying them to guerrillas and organized political dissidents?
Are the laws of war relevant to control of terrorism, both foreign
and domestic? The prevailing view is that "[t]he use of terror-
ist methods by guerrillas deprives the movement of the privi-
leged status which is conferred to guerrilla warfare by the Ge-
neva Convention .. ."I' The countervailing argument is that
the protection afforded by Articles 3 and 4 of the Geneva Con-
vention should be extended to participants in national libera-
tion movements. The terrorist acting as liberationist, these
advocates argue, is entitled to be treated according to the mini-
mum standards for protection of prisoners established by the
Geneva Convention of 1949.30
The answer will inevitably depend upon the focus of the
inquiry. If emphasis is placed upon the causes of violence and
the motive of the actor, then a broadly-based political offense
exception is certainly permissible and, perhaps even desirable.
But, if the emphasis is centered upon the acts of violence and
the resultant social harm, then a different conclusion must be
reached. Terrorism is purposely inhumane; it is fundamentally
the brutalization and the deprivation not only of human rights,
but of life itself. "With the methods used by the IRA against
the English people, or the methods used by the PLO against
Israeli civilians, even foreign travellers in Israel, we reach a
kind of terrorism beyond civilized conception."'"
28. Tran-Tam, Crimes of Terrorism and International Criminal Law, in 1 A TREA-
TISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 499-500 (M.C. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973)
1hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI & NANDA]. See also CROZIER, supra note 2, at 17, 29-
31, 130; Toman, Terrorism and the Regulation of Armed Conflicts, in BASSIOUNI, supra
note 5, at 143, 146-47, 152.
29. Id., at 145-46.
30. Lahey & Sang, Control of Terrorism Through a Broader Interpretation of
Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, in BASSlOUNI, supra note 5, at 191-
200; Mallison & Mallison, supra note 24, at 79-83.
31. Howe, The Ultimate Price of Random Terror, SKEPTIC, Jan./Feb. 1976, at 15.
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The issue of maintaining a political offense exception to
the established legal maxim, aut dedere aut punire, (extradite
or prosecute), remains a divisive one in international law. For
example, no one as yet has been able to develop a workable
definition of political crimes. Even in the last quarter of the
twentieth century, there are no clear guidelines existing in ex-
tradition law and practice. In fact, the multiplicity of compet-
ing interests and conflicting theories offers a serious impedi-
ment to effective criminal law enforcement and to the stability
of world public order. The very concept of a political crime has
been a two-edged sword from the era of the French Revolution
and the Belgian political offense exception statute of 1833. The
still unresolved question is whether protections offered the
"ideologically motivated offender" will derogate individual
rights and personal freedoms. In other words, does national
self-interest outweigh the need for a universal procedural due
process?"
The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has provided a
meaningful standard within the context of Anglo-American
law. Urban terrorists are held to be common criminals. Murder
or the indiscriminate, perpetration of serious bodily harm can-
not be considered acts in furtherance of a political uprising.
Revolutionary activity must not be confused with homicidal
behavior.3 Thus, to grant any excusing condition to political
offenders who have inflicted death and destruction upon inno-
cent third parties is a patent denial of the rule of law, whether
national or international. Even V.I. Lenin, before the Bolshevik
seizure of power in 1917, eschewed terror-violence as a substi-
tute for revolutionary agitation.
34
What, then, is being done; and even more important, what
can be done to inhibit the incidence and the increase of terror-
ist activity? Terrorism, whether national, international, or
transnational, 31 is on the rise with a concomitant threat to the
32. BASSIOUNI, The Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law and Practice,
in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 398-447. See also M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRA-
DITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 368-434 (1974).
33. In re State of Wisconsin and Armstrong, [1972] 28 D.L.R.3d 513 (1972); See
also Green, Terrorism: The Canadian Perspective, in ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 6-
10.
34. V.I. LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE? BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT 74-77
(New World Paperback Ed. 1969).
35. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 109, 130, distinguishes transnational from interna-
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maintenance of world public order.3" Creation of an interna-
tional criminal code defining specific acts of terror-violence as
international crimes, 37 establishing an international criminal
court with jurisdiction over international criminal offenders, :",
and proscribing terrorist attacks upon diplomatic personnel, :'
have all been subjects of draft statutes and conventions, but
they have yet to be enacted into an operative international
legal system, and the question of enforcement has inspired con-
tinuing debate and profound disagreement. Whatever else may
be said, making government officials a protected class while
failing to provide for the security of innocent civilians is cer-
tainly not the answer.
Three civil aviation conventions have been concluded:
Tokyo (1963), The Hague (1970), and Montreal (1971). Yet,
there is not at present "any really concerted and energetic in-
ternational control action, as to aerial piracy, that really has
some teeth in it. . .. "0 The contracting state parties have
agreed to place conduct which endangers the safety of aircraft
within their domestic criminal jurisdiction, but there is no spe-
cial protective status provided for the passengers or the crew
by the state to which the aircraft has been illegally diverted.
Likewise, there is no "sanctions convention" directed against
states which grant safe haven to skyjackers, although the
United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom have vigorously proposed such action. The United States
tional terrorism in that the former is the conduct of individuals or disparate groups,
while the latter indicates a world-wide organizational structure, such as the Socialist
or Communist Internationals.
36. A conclusion reached by the Department of State Conference on International
Terrorism, Washington, D.C., Feb. 25-26, 1976. It was almost the only point upon
which the participants could agree.
37. Palmer, Codification of Terrorism as an International Crime, in BASSIOUNI,
supra note 5, at 507-18 (draft statute proposed); Johnston, Problems in the Enforce-
ment of World Criminal Law, 8 ANZAS J. CRIMINOLOGY 87, 96-100 (1975).
38. De Schutter, Problems of Jurisdiction in the International Control and Re-
pression of Terrorism, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 377-90; Kos-Rabcewicz Zub-
kowski, The Creation of an International Criminal Court, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5,
at 519-36.
39. Murphy, The Role of International Law in the Prevention of Terrorist Kidnap-
ping of Diplomatic Personnel, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 285-313. Cf. C.E. BAU-
MANN, THE DIPLOMATIC KIDNAPPINGS: A REVOLUTIONARY TAcrIc OF URBAN TERRORISM
(1973).
40. E. MCWHINNEY, THE ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
116 (1975).
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has set an example in this regard by enacting more stringent
measures than any other country aimed at control of air pi-
racy." It is regrettable that the proposal of the International
Federation of Airline Pilots to suspend all commercial service
to any country providing refuge for skyjackers has not been
implemented, for this would serve notice to all nations that
sheltering such offenders would be a tortious act subject to
international economic sanctions.
At issue throughout this entire discussion is the role of law
and its operative limitations. As long as "what is terrorism to
some is heroism to others," as long as the preservation of mini-
mum world public order is subordinated to the national inter-
est, and as long as there is no international superstructure
which is capable of dealing with international crime, the strate-
gies of terror-violence are certain to increase. The hard fact and
cold reality is that the maintenance and preservation of inter-
national law and order can only be achieved through a volun-
tary reduction of national sovereignty.42
Liberal democracy also faces some hard choices. In order
for pluralistic societies to deal with the challenge of rebellion
and terror-violence in the last quarter of the twentieth century,
the fundamental freedoms which they take so much for granted
will have to be restricted in some measure-and most likely
reduced-if the current attack on the international state sys-
tem is to be brought under control. The cost of waging terror-
ism, for governments and people, is high. Rebellion and terror-
violence are, in effect, war waged against the state. Thus, "the
real problem, for a pluralistic society, is how to contain subver-
sion while maintaining the freedoms and avoiding the alterna-
tive dangers of the authoritative solution or the totalist hor-
ror."
43
41. Cf. Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What is Being Done, and Lee, International
Suppression of Hijacking, in BASSlOUNI, supra note 5, at 219-56; Sundberg, Piracy and
Terrorism, in 1 BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 28, at 455-90; and Finger, International
Terrorism and the United Nations, in ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 327-46.
42. Bassiouni, Methodological Options for International Legal Control of
Terrorism, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 485-92; Friedlander, Power Politics and the
Rule of Law: Professor Schwarzenberger Reconsidered, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 836 (1975).
43. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 205. Cf. Alexander, Introduction, in ALEXANDER,
supra note 3, at xvi-xix. The latter reluctantly concludes: "[aill that can be done is
to make terrorism less inviting and more costly to its precipitators and supporters."
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Political violence will abide no limitations placed upon it.
Though very few political criminals ever "achieve the monu-
mental climax of their efforts," their historical role has been to
act out their fantasies encompassed by an all-consuming
hatred." Those who worship the cult of force ultimately make
force itself the greater truth. Destruction becomes a way of life
and a way of death. In the words of historian E.J. Hobsbawm,
the worst kind of violence "is the violence which gets out of
anyone's control."45 Terrorism throughout the world is getting
out of control. If not restrained in time the end result may leave
humanity a Hobson's choice-either a global Orwellian future,
or none at all.
44. SCHAFER, supra note 7, at 15.
45. E. HOBSBAWM, REvo LUTIONARIES: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 215 (1973).

